Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Author | |
---|---|
Abstract |
Do the parties in a typical dispute face incentives similar to those in the classic prisoner’s dilemma game? In this paper, we explore whether the costs and benefits of legal representation are such that each party seeks legal representation in the hope of exploiting the other party, while knowing full well that failing to do so will open up the possibility of being exploited. The paper first shows how it is possible to test for the presence of such an incentive structure in a typical dispute resolution system. It then reports estimates of the incentives for the parties to obtain legal representation in wage disputes that were settled by final-offer arbitration in New Jersey. The paper also reports briefly on similar studies of data from discharge grievances, courtannexed |
Year of Publication |
2013
|
Number |
574
|
Date Published |
04/2013
|
Publication Language |
eng
|
Citation Key |
8843
|
URL | |
Working Papers
|