This paper presents evidence on the quality of schooling by race and ethnic
origin in the United States. Although substantial racial segregation
across schools exists, the average pupil-teacher ratio is approximately the
same for black and white students. Hispanic students, however, on average have
l0 percent more students per teacher. Relative to whites, blacks
and Hispanics are less likely to use computers at school and at work. The
implications of these differences in school quality for labor market
outcomes are examined. We conclude by examining reasons for the increase
in the black-white earnings gap since the mid-1970s.

Is there a systematic relation between wage rates and strike out-
cones? This paper addresses the question using a panel of over 2,000
collective bargaining agreements from the Canadian manufacturing sector.
Contrary to the implications of recent signalling and sequential
bargaining models, there is no correlation between contract real wage
rates and strike duration or incidence. Furthermore, lagged strike out-
comes do not affect future wage settlements. On the other hand, there
is some evidence that contract wages affect future strike outcomes, and
also that lagged strike outcomes affect future strike probabilities.

In 1988, the wage distribution in East Germany was much more
compressed than in West Germany or the U.S. Since the
collapse of Communism and unification with West Germany,
however, the wage structure in eastern Germany has changed
considerably. In particular, wage variation has increased,
the payoff to education has decreased somewhat, industry
differentials have expanded, and the white collar premium has
increased. Although average wage growth has been remarkably
high in eastern Germany, individual variation in wage growth
is similar to typical western levels. The wage structure of
former East Germans who work in western Germany resembles the
wage structure of native West Germans in some respects, but
their experience-earnings profile is flat.

In this paper we provide theoretical and empirical analyses of an
asymmetric-information model of layoffs in which the current employer is
better informed about its workers’ abilities than prospective employers
are. The key feature of the model is that when firms have discretion with
respect to whom to lay off, the market infers that laid-off workers are of
low ability. Since no such negative inference should be attached to
workers displaced in a plant closing, our model predicts that the post-
displacement wages of otherwise observationally equivalent workers will be
higher for those displaced by plant closings than for those displaced by
layoffs. A simple extension of our model predicts that the post-
displacement unemployment duration of otherwise observationally equivalent
workers will be lower for those displaced by plant closings than for those
displaced by layoffs.
In our empirical work, we use data from the Displaced Workers Supplements
in the January l984 and 1986 Current Population Surveys. For our whole
sample, we find that the evidence (with respect to both re-employment wages
and post-displacement unemployment duration) is consistent with the idea
that laid-off workers are viewed less favorably by the market than are
those losing jobs in plant closings. Furthermore, our findings are much
stronger for workers laid-off from jobs where employers have discretion
over whom to lay off, and much weaker for workers laid-off from jobs where
employers have little or no discretion over whom to lay off.

This paper examines the relationship between price growth and
skill intensity across 150 manufacturing industries between 1989
and 1995. There are two main findings. First, wage growth and
intermediate goods price increases are passed through to final
product prices roughly in proportion to their factor shares.
Second, product prices have grown relatively less in sectors that
more intensively utilize less-skilled labor. The latter finding
is consistent with the Stolper-Samuelson theory of expanded trade
with countries that are abundant in less-skilled workers, as well
as with some models of technological change.

This paper re-examines the connection between unions and wage
inequality, focussing on three questions: (1) How does the union wage
effect vary across the wage distribution? (2) What is the effect of
unionism on the overall variance of wages at the end of the 1980s?
(3) How much of the increase in the variance of wages over the 1970s
and 1980s can be attributed to changes in the level and distribution
of union coverage?
Cross-sectional union wage gap estimates vary over the wage
distribution, ranging from over 30 percent for lower wage workers to
-10 percent for higher wage workers. Using a longitudinal estimation
technique that accounts for misclassification errors in union status,
I find that this variation represents a combination of a truly larger
wage effect for lower-paid workers, and differential selection
biases.
The estimated effect of unions on the variance of wages in the
late 1980s is relatively modest. Nevertheless, changes in the level
and pattern of unionism -- particularly the decline of unions among
lower wage workers -- have been an important component of the growth
in wage inequality. Changes in unionization account for one-fifth of
the increase of the variance of adult male wages between 1973 and
1987.

This paper examines whether employees who use a computer at work earn
a higher wage rate than otherwise similar workers who do not use a computer
at work. The analysis primarily relies on data from the Current Population
Survey and the High School and Beyond Survey. A variety of statistical
models are estimated to try to correct for unobserved variables that might
be correlated with both job-related computer use and earnings. The
estimates suggest that workers who use computers on their job earn roughly
a 10 to 15 percent higher wage rate. In addition, the estimates suggest
that the expansion in computer use in the 1980s can account for between
one-third and one-half of the observed increase in the rate of return to
education. Finally, occupations that experienced greater growth in
computer use between 1984 and 1989 also experienced above average wage
growth.

Unlike existing models which rely heavily on assumptions regarding unions’
distributional preferences, we present a very simple model in which union
seniority-layoff rules and rising seniority-wage profiles result from
optimal price discrimination against the firm. Surprisingly, even when
cash transfers among union members are ruled out, unions’ optimal
seniority-wage profiles are likely to be completely unaffected by their
distributional preferences because of a kink in the utility-possibility
frontier. This suggests that the simple technology of price discrimination
may play a key role, hitherto unappreciated, in explaining union policies
that affect the relative wellbeing of different union members.