This paper investigates women's and men's labor supply to the firm
within a structural approach based on a dynamic model of new
monopsony. Using methods of survival analysis and a large linked
employer-employee dataset for Germany, we find that labor supply
elasticities are small (1.9-3.7) and that women's labor supply to the firm
is less elas~ic than men's (which is the reverse of gender differences in
labor supply usually found at the level of the market). Our results imply
that about one third of the gender pay gap might be wage discrimination
by profit-maximizing monopsonistic employers.

Using a large sample of establishments drawn from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI) employer survey, we study gender differences in promotion rates and in the wage gains attached to promotions. Several unique features of our data distinguish our analysis from the previous literature on this topic. First, we have information on the wage increases attached to promotions, and relatively few studies on gender differences have considered promotions and wage increases together. Second, our data include job-specific worker performance ratings, allowing us to control for performance and ability more precisely than through commonly-used skill indicators such as educational attainment or tenure. Third, in addition to standard information on occupation and industry, we have data on a number of other firm characteristics, enabling us to control for these variables while still relying on a broad, representative sample, as opposed to a single firm or a similarly narrowly-defined population. Our results indicate that women have lower probabilities of promotion and expected promotion than do men but that there is essentially no gender difference in wage growth with or without promotions.

Low-wage labor markets are traditionally viewed as competitive,
and the possibility of strategic behavior by employers is dismissed.
However, such behavior is not impossible. This paper investigates the
possibility of tacit collusion by low-wage employers while setting wages.
A game-theoretic explanation along the lines of the Folk theorem is offered,
suggesting that a non-binding minimum wage may serve as a
focal point for tacit collusion, proposing a symmetric solution to an
infinitely played game of wage-setting. Several empirical techniques
were employed in testing the hypothesis, including hurdle models of
collusion. CPS monthly data is used for the years 1990-2005, covering
the last four federal minimum wage increases. The likelihood of collusion
at minimum wage is evaluated, as well as its dynamics during
this period. The results generally support the collusion hypothesis and
suggest that employers respond strategically to changes in minimum
wage legislation while using the statutory minimum wage as a coordination
tool in tacit collusion.

There is a substantial body of research in economics and sociology suggesting that personal
contacts are widely used as a method to find jobs. This study investigates how a worker’s labor
market outcomes are related to the gender of the person who refers the worker to his or her job.
Data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth show that information networks are highly
segregated by sex. A significant majority of the men who use contacts use male contacts, and a
significant majority of the women who use contacts use female contacts. In addition, it is found
that both men and women who use male contacts have significantly higher wages than those who
do not use contacts, and men who use female contacts have significantly lower wages than those
who do not use contacts. It is possible that individuals who use female contacts possess other
unobservable characteristics that make them less likely to succeed and individuals who use male
contacts possess other unobservable characteristics that make them more likely to succeed. This
concern is addressed with two econometric models that control for possible endogeneity. First,
an instrumental variables technique is used. The presence of siblings and working siblings are
used as instruments. Next, a three equation maximum likelihood method that explicitly models
the correlation between the errors in the contact and wage equations is used. Corrected results
from both methods are consistent with the ordinary least squares results.