experimental economics

Abstract

Recent studies have investigated arbitrator decision rules in both
experimental and field settings. The external validity of experimental
studies is evaluated by comparing the decisions made in an experiment with
those made in actual cases for a common group of arbitrators. The results
show the decision models used in the two settings are very similar when the
decision problem in the two settings is carefully controlled to be the same.

Year of Publication
1991
Number
284
Date Published
05/1991
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 45, No. 4, July, 1992
Olson, C. ., & Dell’Omo, G. . (1991). A Comparison of Interest Arbitrator Decision -Making in Experimental and Field Settings. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp012v23vt376 (Original work published May 1991)
Working Papers
Author
Abstract

Implementing the ultimatum game experimentally in Indonesia makes it possible to raise the stakes to three times the
monthly expenditure of the average participant. Contrary to predictions in the literature, the results show no evidence
of approaching the sub-game perfect, selfish outcomes. Responders seem to be just as willing to reject a given percentage
offer at high stakes as at low stakes, and Proposers make slightly less selfish offers as the stakes increase.

Year of Publication
1995
Number
345
Date Published
07/1995
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
Economic Inquiry, Vol. 37, No. 1, January 1999
Cameron, L. . (1995). Raising the Stakes in the Ultimatum Game: Experimental Evidence From Indonesia. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01ww72bb50n (Original work published July 1995)
Working Papers