This note reports the results of an experiment which was designed
to test Rubinstein's(1982) theory of bargaining. We were particularly
interested in how it would compare with the hypothesis that bargainers
tend to split a pie 50-50. We duplicated Binmore, Shaked and
Sutton's(1986) result that the equal split hypothesis is rejected in a two
round game with alternating offers. However, we show that in similar
games with more than two rounds Rubinstein's theory is also rejected.
Thus their conclusion, that subjects behave as "gamesmen" (i.e. in a
manner consistent with the predictions of game theory), was premature.
In experiments with varying numbers of rounds, our first players
consistently offered their opponents shares equal to the value of the
second round pie. In a two round game this behaviour by definition
yields offers consistent with Rubinstein's theory. In games with more
rounds it does not.
In each game, the majority of first players chose to make the same
offer. In fact, the regularity of their behaviour is perhaps our
strongest result. While neither Rubinstein's theory nor the equal split
model explain our findings, the regularity of our subjects' behaviour
suggests that there is hope of finding a model of bargaining which
does.

This paper analyzes data on 11,600 students and their teachers who were randomly assigned to
different size classes from kindergarten through third grade. Statistical methods are used to
adjust for non-random attrition and transitions between classes. The main conclusions are: (1)
on average, performance on standardized tests increases by 4 percentile points the first year
students attend small classes; (2) the test score advantage of students in small classes expands by
about one percentile point per year in subsequent years; (3) teacher aides and measured teacher
characteristics have little effect; (4) class size has a larger effect for minority students and those
on free lunch; (5) Hawthorne effects were unlikely.

This paper examines the short-run impacts of a change in residential neighborhood on the
well-being of low-income families, using evidence from a program in which eligibility for a housing
voucher was determined by random lottery. We examine the experiences of households at the
Boston site of Moving To Opportunity (MTO), a demonstration program in five cities. Families in
high poverty public housing projects applied to MTO and were assigned by lottery to one of three
groups: Experimental — offered mobility counseling and a Section 8 subsidy valid only in a Census
tract with a poverty rate of less than 10 percent; Section 8 Comparison — offered a geographically
unrestricted Section 8 subsidy; or Control — offered no new assistance, but continued to be eligible
for public housing.
Our quantitative analyses of program impacts uses data on 540 families from a baseline
survey at program enrollment, a follow-up survey administered l to 3.5 years after random
assignment, and state administrative data on earnings and welfare receipt. 48 percent of the
Experimental group and 62 percent of the Section 8 Comparison group moved through the MTO
program. One to three years after program entry, families in both treatment groups were more likely
to be residing in neighborhoods with low poverty rates and high education levels than were families
in the Control group. However, while members of the Experimental group were much more likely
to be residing in suburban communities than were those in the Section 8 group, the lower program
take-up rate among the Experimental group resulted in more families remaining in the most
distressed communities. Households in both treatment groups experienced improvements in
multiple measures of well-being relative to the Control group including increased safety, improved
health among household heads, and fewer behavior problems among boys. Experimental group
children were also less likely to be a victim of a personal crime, to be injured, or to experience an
asthma attack. There are no significant impacts of either MTO treatment on the employment,
earnings, or welfare receipt of household heads in the first three years after random assignment.