Janet Neelin

First name
Janet
Last name
Neelin
Author
Abstract

In this paper Lilien's (1982) hypothesis that sectoral shifts in employment
raise aggregate unemployment is tested using Canadian quarterly data. Lilien's
framework is extended to investigate regional labour market rigidities and to
distinguish between industry shifts that are correlated with changes in aggregate
activity, and those which are exogenous to the overall level of activity. The
robustness of the results to various changes in model specification is also
investigated. I find that in Canada exogenous shifts in employment between
sectors do not have a significant effect on the aggregate unemployment rate.

Year of Publication
1985
Number
200
Date Published
10/1985
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
Review of Economics and Statistics
Neelin, J. . (1985). Sectoral Shifts and Canadian Unemployment. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp010r967373k (Original work published October 1985)
Working Papers
Abstract

This note reports the results of an experiment which was designed
to test Rubinstein's(1982) theory of bargaining. We were particularly
interested in how it would compare with the hypothesis that bargainers
tend to split a pie 50-50. We duplicated Binmore, Shaked and
Sutton's(1986) result that the equal split hypothesis is rejected in a two
round game with alternating offers. However, we show that in similar
games with more than two rounds Rubinstein's theory is also rejected.
Thus their conclusion, that subjects behave as "gamesmen" (i.e. in a
manner consistent with the predictions of game theory), was premature.
In experiments with varying numbers of rounds, our first players
consistently offered their opponents shares equal to the value of the
second round pie. In a two round game this behaviour by definition
yields offers consistent with Rubinstein's theory. In games with more
rounds it does not.
In each game, the majority of first players chose to make the same
offer. In fact, the regularity of their behaviour is perhaps our
strongest result. While neither Rubinstein's theory nor the equal split
model explain our findings, the regularity of our subjects' behaviour
suggests that there is hope of finding a model of bargaining which
does.

Year of Publication
1986
Number
207
Date Published
05/1986
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
The American Economic Review, Vol. 78, No. 4, Sept., 1988
Neelin, J. ., Sonnenschein, H. ., & Spiegel, M. . (1986). An Experimental Test of Rubinstein’s Theory of Bargaining. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01p2676v54q (Original work published May 1986)
Working Papers
Author
Abstract

A data set composed of teachers' contracts in the Canadian province
of British Columbia is used to examine the effect of arbitration on
collective bargaining outcomes. The data set is unique in that it
spans 35 years of arbitration experience.
I do not find any evidence of an effect of arbitration on wage
rates. Strong positive state—dependence exists in the data: Bargaining
pairs that used arbitration last period are more likely to do so this
period. However, the probability of going to arbitration is only
marginally increased by arbitrations that occured more than one year in
the past. Fixed effects associated with bargaining pairs were not as
important as theories which link dispute rates to characteristics of
individual bargainers would suggest.
No relationship was found between the percentage of arbitrations and
levels of macro-economic variables. Some evidence is presented that
the moving average of the percentage of arbitrations is high when there
is upward pressure on teacher's wages. The coefficient of variation of
the Canadian CPI was positively correlated with the percentage of
arbitrations, which suggests that economic uncertainty increases the
number of disputes.
Finally, a simple model of arbitrator behavior proposed by
Ashenfelter et al., is remarkably consistent with these data.
In particular, I find that arbitrated settlements can be predicted solely
on the basis of the negotiated settlements reached in the nine month
period prior to arbitration. I also find that the variance of
arbitrated settlements is significantly lower than the variance of the
preceding negotiated settlements in 13 of 21 years. On the other hand,
the estimated coefficients in the prediction equations for arbitrated and
negotiated settlements are significantly different, with the arbitrated
settlements giving more weight to lagged wage outcomes.

Year of Publication
1987
Number
217
Date Published
01/1987
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
8214
Neelin, J. . (1987). An Empirical Study of Dispute Resolution Under an Arbitration System: The Case of British Columbia’s Teachers. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01sf268511c (Original work published January 1987)
Working Papers