Thanks to standardized work protocol and technology of McDonald’s restaurants, the hourly wage of McDonald’s Basic Crew enables wage comparisons under near-identical skill inputs and hedonic job conditions. McWages capture labor costs in entry-level jobs, while the Big Macs (earned) Per Hour (BMPH) index measures corresponding purchasing power of wages. We document large and growing geographical wage differences in standardized jobs using data covering most U.S. counties during 2016-2023. Before the Covid-19 pandemic, there was no BMPH growth where minimum wages stayed constant, but the pandemic wage increase, which diminished the importance of minimum wages, was stronger in these areas.

The last decade has witnessed a number of remarkable developments in public policy, laws, and law enforcement that are associated with failures of competition in US labor markets. These include: (1) enforcement actions and antitrust lawsuits with regard to explicit conspiracies to suppress competition in labor markets; (2) the documentation and forced abolition of franchise contracts that include worker "no-poaching" clauses; (3) explicit discussion of the regulation of mergers that affect labor market competition; and (4) legislation and regulation that affect "non-compete' and "non-solicit" clauses in employment contracts. In addition, there have been some highly visible examples of explicit collusion in labor markets, and these have raised questions about the extent to which competition has been damaged. This paper covers one such alleged conspiracy to reduce labor market competition among workers in the studio animation industry.3

The last decade has witnessed a number of remarkable developments in public policy, laws and law enforcement that have been associated with failures of competition in US labour markets. These include: (1) enforcement actions and antitrust law suits regarding explicit conspiracies to suppress competition in labour markets; (2) the documentation and forced abolition of franchise contracts that include worker ‘no-poaching’ clauses; (3) explicit discussion of the regulation of mergers that affect labour market competition; and (4) legislation and regulation affecting ‘non-compete’ and ‘non-solicit’ clauses in employment contracts. In the following, I review the recent developments in public policy. I begin with a deconstruction of a particularly high-level conspiracy to reduce labour market competition in the High-Tech world.

Based on hourly wage rates from nearly all McDonald’s restaurants, and prices of the Big Mac sandwich, we find an elasticity of the wage with respect to the minimum wage of 0.7. This elasticity does not differ between affected and unaffected restaurants because many restaurants maintain a constant wage ‘premium’ above the minimum wage. Higher minimum wages are not associated with faster adoption of touch-screen ordering, and there is near-full price pass-through of minimum wages. Minimum wages lead to higher real wages (expressed in Big Macs per hour) that are one fifth lower than the corresponding increases in nominal wages.

Using data on adult male workers we first investigate the
incremental effect of a year of schooling on unemployed hours,
and use this calculation to explain the difference in the pro-
portional effects of schooling on earnings and wages. Schooling
apparently reduces unemployed hours by reducing the incidence of
unemployment spells, but it does not significantly affect their
duration. We next test whether unemployed hours represent
real constraints on worker behavior. To do this we develop
and estimate life—cycle models of labor supply for workers with
and without spells of unemployment using longitudinal data. The
results imply that perhaps three-quarters of the unemployed hours
of male workers are part of the offer to sell labor.

This paper reviews Robert Lalonde's contributions to labor economics and introduces a set of papers that were written in his honor and presented to him in the spring of 2015 at a conference held in his honor in Chicago.