Orley Ashenfelter

First name
Orley
Last name
Ashenfelter
Abstract

This paper summarizes the results of nearly a dozen new papers presented at the Sundance Conference on Monopsony in Labor Markets held in October 2018.  These papers, to be published as a special issue of the Journal of Human Resources, study various aspects of monopsony and failures of competition in labor markets. It also reports on the new developments in public policies associated with widespread concerns about labor market competition and efforts to ameliorate competitive failures. The conference papers range from studies of the labor supply elasticity individual firms face to studies of local labor market concentration to studies of explicit covenants suppressing labor market competition. New policies range from private and public antitrust litigation to concerns about the effect of mergers and inter-firm agreements on labor market competition. We provide a detailed discussion of the mechanics of the Silicon Valley High Tech Worker conspiracy to suppress competition based on Court documents in the case. Non-compete agreements, which are not enforceable in three states already, have also come under scrutiny.  

Year of Publication
2021
Number
652
Date Published
10/2021
Ashenfelter, O., Card, D., Farber, H., & Ransom, M. R. (2021). Monopsony in the Labor Market New Empirical Results and New Public Policies. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp016m311s43b (Original work published 10/2021AD)
Working Papers
Keywords
Abstract

Based on hourly wage rates from nearly all McDonald’s restaurants, and prices of the Big Mac sandwich, we find an elasticity of the wage with respect to the minimum wage of 0.7. This elasticity does not differ between affected and unaffected restaurants because many restaurants maintain a constant wage ‘premium’ above the minimum wage. Higher minimum wages are not associated with faster adoption of touch-screen ordering, and there is near-full price pass-through of minimum wages. Minimum wages lead to higher real wages (expressed in Big Macs per hour) that are one fifth lower than the corresponding increases in nominal wages.

Year of Publication
2021
Number
646
Date Published
01/2021
Ashenfelter, O., & Jurajda, Š. (2021). Wages, Minimum Wages, and Price Pass-Through: The Case of McDonald’s Restaurants. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01sb397c318 (Original work published 01/2021AD)
Working Papers
Abstract

This paper contains some early results of a longer term empirical
study of a New Jersey arbitration statute that covers police officers and
firefighters. The purpose of this larger study is twofold. First, we hope
to shed some light on how differences in the structure of arbitration
mechanisms affect the size and frequency of negotiated settlements as well
as arbitration outcomes. This is possible in New Jersey because the same
panel of arbitrators administers both final—offer and conventional arbitra-
tion systems simultaneously. Second, it is our view that arbitration
systems share much in common with other judicial and quasi-judicial dispute
settlement mechanisms. It is our hope to shed some light on the more
general issues surrounding the design and evaluation of these systems
through the much needed empirical study of the operation of one such
system. In this paper we report some important results for the interpreta-
tion and evaluation of arbitrator impartiality under the New Jersey sta-
tute. We suspect these results are equally relevant for the interpretation
of other arbitration experiences.

Year of Publication
1983
Number
163
Date Published
05/1983
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
7855
Ashenfelter, O., & Bloom, D. (1983). The Pitfalls in Judging Arbitrator Impartiality by Win-Loss Tallies Under Final-Offer Arbitration. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp015h73pw05m (Original work published 05/1983AD)
Working Papers
Abstract

In this paper we set out a simple model of optimal schooling investments that
emphasizes the interaction between schooling choices and income determination; and
estimate it using a fresh sample of data on over 700 identical twins. According to the model,
equally able individuals from the same family should attain the same observed schooling
levels, apart from random errors of optimization or measurement. A variety of direct and
indirect tests provides no evidence against this hypothesis.
We estimate an average return to schooling of 10% for genetically identical
individuals, but estimated returns are slightly higher for less able individuals. Unlike the
results in Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994), which were based on a much smaller sample, we
estimate that schooling is positively correlated with ability level, so that simple cross-section
estimates are slightly upward biased. Taken together these empirical results imply that
more able individuals attain more schooling because they face lower marginal costs of
schooling, not because they obtain higher marginal benefits. The results stand in sharp
contrast to recent claims that genetic factors predetermine education and income, and that
such differences are not amenable to alteration by public or private choices.

Year of Publication
1996
Number
365
Date Published
07/1996
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 113, No. 1, February, 1998
Ashenfelter, O., & Rouse, C. (1996). Income, Schooling, and Ability: Evidence from a New Sample of Twins. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01z316q158c (Original work published 07/1996AD)
Working Papers
Abstract

In this paper we set out some methods that utilize the longitudinal
structure of earnings of trainees and a comparison group to estimate the
effectiveness of training for the 1976 cohort of CETA trainees. By
fitting a components-of—variance model of earnings to the control group,
and by posing a simple model of program participation, we are able to
predict the entire pre-training and post—training earnings histories
of the trainees. The fit of these predictions to the pre-training
earnings of the CETA participants provides a test of the model of
earnings generation and program participation and a simple check on
the corresponding estimate of the effectiveness of training.
Two assumptions have a strong influence on the magnitude of the
estimated training effects: the timing of the decision to participate
in training, and the presence or absence of individual-specific trends
in earnings. We find considerable evidence that trainee earnings con—
tain permanent, transitory,and trend—like components of selection bias.
We are less successful
in empirically distinguishing between alternative
assumptions on the timing of the participation decision. If earnings
in the year prior to training are the appropriate selection criterion,
then our estimate of the training effect for adult male CETA partici-
pants is about 300 dollars per year. Our estimates for female CETA
participants are larger and less sensitive to alternative models of
program participation.

Year of Publication
1984
Number
174
Date Published
11/1984
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 67, No. 4, 1985
Ashenfelter, O., & Card, D. (1984). Using the Longitudinal Structure of Earnings to Estimate the Effect of Training Programs. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp018s45q877p (Original work published 11/1984AD)
Working Papers
Abstract

This paper presents data on airline mechanics at eight of the
largest U.S. airlines and describes the impact of the 1978 Airline
Deregulation Act on their wage rates and employment levels. The major
findings are: (1) up to 1983, real and relative wage rates of airline
mechanics remained more or less constant across firms and over time; (2)
the independence of mechanics’ wage rates from firm-specific employment
conditions after 1978 is consistent with pre-deregulatory experiences;
(3) deregulation contributed to an existing trend of declining
employment; and (4) deregulation did not bring about any systematic
increase in mechanics’ productivity.

Year of Publication
1985
Number
193
Date Published
06/1985
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 94, No. 3, 1986
Ashenfelter, O., & Brown, J. (1985). Testing the Efficiency of Employment Contracts. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01hq37vn59z (Original work published 06/1985AD)
Working Papers
Year of Publication
1974
Number
52
Date Published
08/1974
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
8400
Ashenfelter, O., & Heckman, J. (1974). Measuring the Effect of an Antidiscrimination Program. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01rj430455t (Original work published 08/1974AD)
Working Papers
Year of Publication
1974
Number
57
Date Published
11/1974
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
Review of Economic Studies, October 1976
Ashenfelter, O., & Abbott, M. (1974). Labor Supply, Commodity Demand, and the Allocation of Time. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp012n49t169q (Original work published 11/1974AD)
Working Papers
Year of Publication
1974
Number
60
Date Published
12/1974
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
The Collected Essays of Orley Ashenfelter. Volume 2 Edited by Kevin F. Hallock (Cheltenham, U.K. and Lyme, N.H.: Elgar) 1997
Ashenfelter, O. (1974). The Effect of Manpower Training Earnings: Preliminary Results. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01pn89d6584 (Original work published 12/1974AD)
Working Papers
Year of Publication
1978
Number
107
Date Published
01/1978
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
Proceedings of the 1977 Meeting of the Association of University Teachers of Economics, In M.J. Artis and A.R. Nobay (eds.) Contemporary Economic Analysis, (London:Croon Helm for the Association of University Teachers of Economics, 1978.)
Ashenfelter, O. (1978). Unemployment as a Constraint on Labour Market Behaviour. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp015138jd85j (Original work published 01/1978AD)
Working Papers