Orley Ashenfelter
This paper summarizes the results of nearly a dozen new papers presented at the Sundance Conference on Monopsony in Labor Markets held in October 2018. These papers, to be published as a special issue of the Journal of Human Resources, study various aspects of monopsony and failures of competition in labor markets. It also reports on the new developments in public policies associated with widespread concerns about labor market competition and efforts to ameliorate competitive failures. The conference papers range from studies of the labor supply elasticity individual firms face to studies of local labor market concentration to studies of explicit covenants suppressing labor market competition. New policies range from private and public antitrust litigation to concerns about the effect of mergers and inter-firm agreements on labor market competition. We provide a detailed discussion of the mechanics of the Silicon Valley High Tech Worker conspiracy to suppress competition based on Court documents in the case. Non-compete agreements, which are not enforceable in three states already, have also come under scrutiny.
Based on hourly wage rates from nearly all McDonald’s restaurants, and prices of the Big Mac sandwich, we find an elasticity of the wage with respect to the minimum wage of 0.7. This elasticity does not differ between affected and unaffected restaurants because many restaurants maintain a constant wage ‘premium’ above the minimum wage. Higher minimum wages are not associated with faster adoption of touch-screen ordering, and there is near-full price pass-through of minimum wages. Minimum wages lead to higher real wages (expressed in Big Macs per hour) that are one fifth lower than the corresponding increases in nominal wages.
Is the correlation between income and educational attainment a result of
the payoff to investments in schooling? Since the experiment of randomly
selecting individuals to go to school cannot be performed, non-experimental
methods must be used to estimate the economic returns to schooling. This
paper reviews new studies that measure the effect of schooling on income (1)
by using comparisons of brothers, fathers and sons, and twins and (2) that
focus on natural experiments. These studies provide very credible evidence
that schooling does increase incomes and that earlier studies may have under-
estimated the role of schooling in determining incomes.
In this paper we study the role of covenants in franchise contracts that restrict the recruitment and hiring of employees from other units within the same franchise chain in suppressing competition for workers. Based on an analysis of 2016 Franchise Disclosure Documents, we find that "no- poaching of workers agreements" are included in a surprising 58 percent of major franchisors' contracts, including McDonald's, Burger King, Jiffy Lube and H&R Block. The implications of these no-poaching agreements for models of oligopsony are also discussed. No-poaching agreements are more common for franchises in low-wage and high-turnover industries.
In this paper we study the long-term labor market implications of school resource equalization
before Brown and school desegregation after Brown. For cohorts born in the South in the 1920s and
1930s, we find that racial disparities in measurable school characteristics had a substantial influence on
black males’ earnings and educational attainment measured in 1970, albeit one that was smaller in the
later cohorts. When we examine the income of male workers in 1990, we find that southern-born blacks
who finished their schooling just before effective desegregation occurred in the South fared poorly
compared to southern-born blacks who followed behind them in school by just a few years.
Arbitration systems are often used to resolve labor disputes
because on-going employment relationships are likely to contain specific
(human capital) investments. Recent research indicates that the ex ante
acceptability of arbitration to the parties must depend, in part, on the
unpredictability of the arbitrator's award. It is shown that the usual
selection process for arbitrators does imply that arbitrator decisions
should be statistically exchangeable (in the limit), and the evidence
available to date supports this hypothesis.