John DiNardo

First name
John
Last name
DiNardo
Abstract

In this paper we develop and test a very general implication of
competitive contractual arrangements in the labor market. Toward this end
we examine whether the level of unemployment prevailing at the beginning of
the job has lasting effects on wage payments throughout the job. The
intuition behind this test is straightforward. If the labor market
functions as a competitive contracting market, then it is the supply and
demand conditions at the time of negotiating the contract that determine
the wage provisions of the contract. Using data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) we
find that wages strongly depend on the labor market conditions prevailing
at the beginning of one’s job. Moreover, our results indicate that the
value of new employment contracts varies by approximately l0 percent over
the business cycle.

Year of Publication
1989
Number
252
Date Published
05/1989
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
8115
DiNardo, J., & Beaudry, P. (1989). Long-Term Contracts and Equilibrium Models of the Labor Market: Some Favorable Evidence. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01kd17cs85n (Original work published May 1989)
Working Papers
Year of Publication
2010
Number
555
Date Published
04/2010
Publication Language
eng
Citation Key
8223
DiNardo, J., & Lee, D. (2010). Program Evaluation and Research Designs. Retrieved from http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01ms35t863r (Original work published April 2010)
Working Papers